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Public Perceptions of Corruption in East Asia:
A Comparative Study of Japan, Singapore, and South Korea
Isaiah Nielsen
ABSTRACT
This research analyzes perceptions of corruption through comparative case studies of South Korea,
Japan, and Singapore. It looks to political party affiliation and socioeconomic status for effects on
an individual’s perception of corruption. It hypothesizes that individuals more affiliated with the
ruling party will perceive the government as less corrupt and individuals that are less affiliated will
perceive it as more. Socioeconomic status is split into income, social status, and education
variables. Individuals with a lower income and status will perceive the government as more
corrupt, while overall higher status and income individuals will perceive it as less. On the other
hand, education is predicted to have the opposite: the more educated will perceive more corruption
than the less educated. This research found that the hypotheses are not all supported, but the
statistical results from the South Korea case are much stronger than in Singapore and Japan. The
results and analysis can be beneficial to the future study of perceptions of corruption.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption has been a salient topic of political science research for decades. One important aspect
of corruption research is the problem of perception. Perception of the level of government
corruption will vary from one individual to another. What then are the factors that affect varying
levels of perceived corruption? This research focuses on two factors that affect an individual’s
perception of corruption – political party affiliation and socioeconomic standing (income, social
status, and education). This research answers the following question: To what extent does political
party affiliation (partisanship) and socioeconomic standing (income, social status, and education)
affect an individual’s perception of corruption? The research uses South Korea, Japan, and
Singapore as case studies to study this question.
This research chose individuals in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore as the unit of analysis. These
countries were chosen for following reasons: they are all considered democratic 1, have similar
Confucian influence, share regional proximity, have historical connections, and possess quickly
emerging and strong economies. Most importantly, corruption has been accepted as rampant in this
region, but corruption perceptions research remains scarce.
This research has four main hypotheses: 1) Individuals affiliated with the ruling party are less
likely to perceive corruption. Conversely, individuals less affiliated with the ruling party are more
likely to perceive corruption. Individuals will be more forgiving of the party they helped to put in
power, but those who are kept out of power will likely be more critical. 2) Lower income
individuals are more likely to perceive corruption, while higher income individuals are less likely
China and North Korea, countries more associated with corruption, were not chosen for this design. North Korea and
China are excluded because there is no reliable polling data. Either respondents would fear repercussions and change
their answer, or the government would fabricate the responses. Either way, it is best to study corruption in similar
forms of government because corruption can take on drastically different meanings morally and legally in nondemocratic states (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002).
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to perceive corruption. Those in more difficult financial situations are likely to be critical of the
government, while wealthier individuals tend to be supportive of the government. 3) Individuals of
lower social status are more likely perceive corruption, while those of higher social status are less
likely to perceive corruption. Individuals that consider themselves left out will also be more
watchful for corruption, but individuals with higher status may be more lenient with the
government. 4) Educated individuals are more likely perceive corruption, while less educated
individuals are less likely to perceive corruption. More educated individuals will better understand
their political institutions and corruption’s negative effects on, but less educated will not.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on corruption became active in the last few decades (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).
Transparency International’s well-known Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was not developed
until the late 1990s. In Singapore, South Korea, and Japan, the taboo on research of political
corruption has only recently been broken (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Quah 1999). The
aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which saw one of the largest International Monetary
Fund (IMF) bailouts ever in South Korea, revealed corruption in East Asia and many theories arose
in the literature (Weder 1999). Increasing awareness of corruption in East Asia captivated scholars’
attention to understand the impact corruption has on the all-important economic growth (Kang
2002; Mauro 1995; Sam 2005; Weder 1999). This research, however, differentiates itself from
studying corruption’s effects on growth to studying the variables that affect the perceptions
themselves.
Corruption literature has established a connection between political party affiliation and
perceptions of corruption. Using survey data in Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico, one study found
that individuals with politically affiliated to an opposition party are more likely perceive
government corruption (Davis, Camp, and Coleman 2004). Another study of respondents in Spain
that found that individuals more affiliated with the party in power are less likely to perceive
government corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013). The literature recognizes that
“partisanship conditions attitudes toward corruption” (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013, 1664).
The literature on socioeconomic status is summed well by this premise: “those most harmed by
corruption should perceive more of it” (Maeda and Ziegfeld 2015, 5). Using aggregated data, one
study found that socioeconomic status does increase perceptions of corruption (Maeda and Ziegfeld
2015) 2. A study of Britain showed that higher socioeconomic groups tended to hold a higher trust
in the government (Xenakis 2010). The study explains that this trend is likely because in Britain the
elite are generally more likely to be involved with or participating in the government. Interestingly,
it found that lower socioeconomic groups also had a low perception of corruption – against the
conventional wisdom of scholars (Xenakis 2010). It credits this to low participation either by
choice or exclusion by elite. The issue here is that whether it is low participation or low perceptions
that is causing the other is unclear (Kostadinova 2009). One study of Russia found that individuals
from less developed regions tend to view the government as more corrupt than in more developed
regions (Sharafutdinova 2010). It links this to general dissatisfaction with the current politicians but
says these areas are not always politically competitive which is another established factor in
perceptions of corruption (Davis, Camp, and Coleman 2004; Sharafutdinova 2010).
The authors note that in significantly poorer countries the trend was not as strong. They hypothesize that poverty is a
more concerning to the public than corruption (Maeda and Ziegfeld 2015).
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Other studies explore whether perceptions of corruption can stand in for the real levels of
corruption or not and other potential sources of bias (Charron 2016; Olken 2009; Park and Lee
2017). Whether or not “perceived corruption” is a perfect reflection of “real corruption” is not the
point (Morris 2008; Treisman 2007). As some scholars point out, “the tendency of citizens to
believe that their governments are corrupt is politically consequential” (Davis, Camp, and Coleman
2004, 700). For example, high perceived corruption hinders reporting on crime (Soares 2004),
discourages voting (Kostadinova 2014), and changes who they vote for (Slomczynski and Shabad
2012). Furthermore, it affects the countries and governments itself. For example, high perceived
corruption dampens foreign aid and investments (Davis and Ruhe 2003; Treisman 2007), hampers
economic growth overall (Mauro 1995), hurts government efficiency (Heidenheimer and Johnston
2002), and erodes the public’s trust in their government and political system (Anderson and
Tverdova 2003; Bowen and Kassiola 2002; Tan and Tambyah 2011; Wang 2016). Corruption
disenfranchises individuals and high perceptions affect their actions; hence, it is important to
empirically understand it (Davis, Camp, and Coleman 2004; Treisman 2007). Therefore, East
Asian studies on partisanship and socioeconomic status is a fitting addition to this literature to on
the perceptions of corruption.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DEFINITIONS
The research design of this study is a comparative case study of survey data. Due to its nature, it is
both a quantitative and qualitative work. This study works primarily with data from Wave 4 of the
Asian Barometer Survey 3 completed during 2014 and 2015. Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) will be used to show the general trends on a recognized index
with the countries, but no statistical analysis. 4 It will only be used to note if there is a substantial
shift in CPI from one year to the next (Treisman 2007) and give a general understanding of how
corruption is perceived in these countries. Historical context and quantitative analysis of Asian
Barometer Survey is the core of this comparative case study (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff
2016). 5
The dependent variable, “perceptions of corruption” is fairly self-explanatory, but “corruption” is
not. Corruption has been difficult to gauge and define due to its inherent illegality. Corruption
tends to not be fully understood until after scandals have been discovered and investigated
(Woodall 1996). Consequently, there is several definitions that are debated in the literature
(Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002); nonetheless, the following definition will be used for the basis
of this study:
Political corruption [is] where a public official, in violation of the trust placed in him by the public,
and in a manner harmful to public interest, knowingly engages in conduct which exploits the office
Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey was distributed by the Asian Barometer Project Office (see
“Acknowledgements”). The survey was completed in 2014 in Japan and Singapore and in 2015 in South Korea.
4
This is due to differences in design and sometimes surveys from one year to the next. It is better to avoid that issue
entirely by using different data (Treisman 2007).
5
Regarding the external validity of this design: It is an understandable criticism, but “potential bias of this sort is not
limited to case studies.” (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2016, 201). This design is the best for the purposes of this
study. The following should be noted as well: this is only one survey. That means that the model created in this
research cannot account for the effects the history of corruption and its perceptions has had on the independent
variables.
3
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for clear personal or private gain in a way which runs contrary to the accepted rules and standards
for the conduct of public office within the political culture, so as to benefit a third party by
providing [the third party] with access to a good or service [the third party] would otherwise not
obtain. (Philp 2002, 42).

This provides enough detail for broad comparative use and supports broad comparative use. Then,
perceptions of corruption are simply what level an individual perceives government corruption.
The two independent variables are political party affiliation and socioeconomic status. Political
party affiliation is understood as the level of how strongly one supports or aligns with a political
party. In this study, it will be important whether they align with the ruling party. Socioeconomic
status is already an established index that is generally defined as a combination of education levels,
job sector, status, and income (American Psychological Association 2019). This study will run
separate analyses for each except of job sector 6 to test the socioeconomic status.
DATA AND FINDINGS
South Korea, Singapore, and Japan contain “elite cartel” forms of corrupt institutions (Hellmann
2017). The “elite cartel” is the term when businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, etc. exchange
money and favors for political or financial advantage. In each country it looks slightly different.
South Korea has a powerful business establishment (the chaebol), enduring bureaucrats, and a
polarized partisan climate. Politicians, fearing turnover, seek monetary support in exchange for
favors later. Japanese and Singaporean officials exchange public work contracts and government
programs for campaign money to keep single-party dominance (Hellmann 2017). South Korean
citizens have generally been disapproving of corruption and there have been attempts to curb it to
some success (Weder 1999), but the perception remains high. Singapore has been perceived as
one of the top cleanest countries and an exemplary country in anti-corruption policy, but they are
not exempt from their elite cartel ways (Hellmann 2017). Japan’s government remains somewhere
in between but is still widely seen as mostly corrupt (Woodall 1996). Nonetheless, they all have
the similarity of elite groups working together unfairly/illegally to keep or gain power at the
expense of the public they are supposed torepresent.

Job sector is too difficult to quantitatively use as potential dependent variable with the data currently possessed. It is
limited in regression use and statistically analyzing it would require making assumptions and decisions that may
hamper its overall helpfulness to understanding socioeconomic status’ and perceptions of corruption’s relationship.
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Source: Transparency International (accessed Feb. 7,2021).
Notes: The higher score the less corrupt the country is perceived to be, the lower scores indicate a higher level of
corruption. The early years for CPI have a scoring method out of ten and the later ones out of one hundred. The
earlier ones are excluded in this chart have slightly different methods and less countries but are included anyway. This
chart does not include the variance foreach year, nor the number of surveys used. This is not a statistical analysis, but
a way of visualizing the general level in each of the case studies.

DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 7
Respondents were asked on a scale of 1-4 how widespread they think corruption and bribe-taking
are in their local and national governments – the higher the number, the more corrupt they saw the
officials as. To more accurately gauge perceptions of corruption, both local and national models
were created (Table 1). The frequencies show some critical caveats that must be addressed (Figure
2). Japan and Singapore have a massive skew towards a much lower perception of corruption,
while, in South Korea, it is more split. This problem exists in both the national and local models.
To alleviate the skew and allow for better analysis, the perception variables were transformed to be
dichotomous (1 - no officials or few are corrupt; 2 - many officials or all are corrupt).

The control variables are not analyzed in depth but are summarized here. Age (increasing number = increasing in
age), trust in national government (1-4: increasing number =less trust), trust in civil service (1-4: increasing number =
less trust), and interest in politics (1-4:increasing number = more interest). Age is a common control variable. The
variables on trust in institutions/officials were chosen because of the acknowledged relationship gleaned from the
literature. Interest in politics was to control for those who are just interested in politics and may have inherent extra
concern in corruption. Also, a correlation matrix showed they had the least impact on each other.
7
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Table 1: National and Local Perceptions Correlation 8
South Korea
Japan
Singapore

r = .695** and two-tailed sig. test = .000
r = .533** and two-tailed sig. test = .000
r = .636** and two-tailed sig. test = .000

Source: Data used from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 4. See “Acknowledgements” about distribution.
The survey was completed in 2014 in Japan and Singapore and 2015 in South Korea.

Source: Data used from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey. See “Acknowledgements” about distribution of data.
The surveys were completed in 2014 in Japan and Singapore and 2015 in South Korea.

Respondents were asked to choose which party they felt closest to from a list of political parties
corresponding to their countries. In every case, there were many respondents that were either nonaligned or aligned with smaller parties. To ensure testing was possible, the variables were
transformed to be dichotomous. The transformed variable placed all respondents into two following
categories: 1 – those non-aligned or aligned with an opposition party; 2 – those aligned with the
ruling party.
Table 2: Political Affiliation Variable
South Korea 1 = Non-aligned and all opposition parties

2 = Saenuri Party (ruling)

Japan

1 = Non-aligned and all opposition parties

2 = Liberal Democratic Party(LDP)
(ruling)

Singapore

1 = Non-aligned and all opposition parties

2 = People’s Action Party (PAP)
(ruling)

Source: Original data found at Asian Barometer Survey Wave 4. See the “Acknowledgements” about distribution. The
surveys were completed in 2014 in Japan and Singapore and 2015 in South Korea.

* denotes statistical significance at a 95% confidence interval (p< .05). ** denotes statistical significance at a 99%
confidence interval (p< .01).
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Respondents were asked their education level, their social status, and their quintile income level.
The education variable is a scale starting at “no education” and ending at “post-graduate
education.” The social status variable is a scale from 1-10 and the quintile income variable is a
scale from 1-5. A higher number means more education, more income, and higher status. A lower
number signifies less education, less income, and lower status. They were also transformed, but
only to remove those who did not respond – something done with all the variables in this research.
THE MODELS AND RESULTS
The dependent variables are dichotomous. Since dichotomous variables are non-linear, traditional
linear regression is not possible for these models. Hence, for a robust claim, it is best to run a
binary logistic regression test with control variables to create regression models. The results are
given in the following tables:
Table 3: Singapore Models for Local and National Perceptions
Local Model
National Model
Variable
B
Sig. B
Sig.
.182
.666 .281
.538
Political Party Affiliation
Education
.065
.596 -.012
.924
.247
.098 .034
.820
Subjective Social Status
Income Quintile
-.561** .008 -.405
.067
.954** .006 .808*
.028
Trust in National Government
Trust in Civil Servants
.557
.089 .155
.662
-.031*
.049 -.039*
.024
Age
Interest in Politics
-.247
.277 -.205
.414
Overall Model Signifiers
Model Significance
.000**
.004**
.203
.127
Nagelkerke R for Model

Source: Data used from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey. See “Acknowledgements” about distribution of data.
Note: This survey was taken in Singapore in 2014.

Table 4: Japan Models for Local and National Perceptions
Local Model
National Model
Variable
B
Sig. B
Sig.
.004
.982 .082
.670
Political Party Affiliation
Education
-.155*
.012 -.159**
.010
-.221** .000 -.155*
.011
Subjective Social Status
Income Quintile
-.174*
.019 -.062
.407
.213
.204 .454**
.008
Trust in National Government
Trust in Civil Servants
.647** .000 .487**
.002
-.027** .000 -.021**
.000
Age
Interest in Politics
-.041
.741 .032
.792
Overall Model Signifiers
Model Significance
.000**
.000**
.160
.131
Nagelkerke R for Model

Source: Data used from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey. See “Acknowledgements” about distribution of
data. Note: This survey was taken in Japan in 2014.
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Table 5: South Korea Models for Local and National Perceptions
Variable
Political Party Affiliation
Education
Subjective Social Status
Income Quintile
Trust in National Government
Trust in Civil Servants
Age
Interest in Politics
Overall Model Signifiers
Model Significance
Nagelkerke R for Model

Local Model
B
Sig.
-.372** .008
.038
.425
-.123** .009
-.066
.241
.235*
.012
.359** .000
.000
.944
-.042
.610

National Model
B
Sig.
-.577** .000
.050
.299
-.204** .000
-.004
.937
.300**
.001
.122
.214
-.002
.783
-.061
.454

.000**
.068

.000**
.082

Source: Data used from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey. See “Acknowledgements” about distribution of data.
Note: This survey was taken in South Korea in 2015.

In the Singapore model, political party affiliation is weak and statistically insignificant in both
models. The education variable is inconsistent between the local and national models and without
significant confidence. The social status variable has a positive relationship in both the national
and local models, but also not significant. The last variable, the income, has a strong relationship
in the predicted direction in both models but it is only statistically significant in the local model.
In the Japan model, political party affiliation has an incredibly weak relationship and no statistical
significance in both models. The education relationship is negative and has strong statistical
significance but moderate to weak relationship in both models. Subjective social variable is
significant in both local and national and has decent strength. Income has a negative relationship in
both the national and local perceptions but is only significant in the local.
In the South Korea model, the political party affiliation relationship is strong and statistically
significant in both models – especially in the national model. Education has a positive relationship,
but a very weak and statistically insignificant relationship in both models. For the subjective social
variable, it is significant but not extraordinarily strong in either model. Income quintile, on the
other hand, is neither significant nor strong in either model.
DISCUSSION
The Singapore model does not support any of the hypotheses with the potential exception of
income – the only variable with a strong and significant relationship. The main reason for
this result is the massive skew in the frequency in perceptions (Figure 2) – over 90% of
respondents perceived little or no corruption. This causes difficulties when trying to outright
support or reject the causal factors of the respondents with high perceptions. There is an
extraordinarily strong positive relationship with those who trust the government less also
having a high perception of corruption. Considering most respondents in Singapore trust their
government, it is unsurprising that the few people with low trust also perceive more
corruption. Even with a significant model and a stronger Nagelkerke r-square, it does not
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really support any my hypotheses almost at all which is attributed, mainly, to the skew.
The Japan model supports more of the hypotheses but suffers the same skew problem as
Singapore. The political party affiliation relationship is weak and different from the predicted
direction, but this is also unreliable due to the skew. Japan’s education relationship is different
from the other two cases in that it is a negative relationship and statistically significant with a
moderate-weak B in both models – which is not what I hypothesized. This could be because the
more educated acknowledge corruption as the way of politics and life and the less educated have
been accustomed to government scandals (Woodall 1996). The social status and income variables
go in the predicted directions and have some statistically significance. In sum, the Japan model
with its significance and a solid Nagelkerke r-square more closely supports my hypotheses on
social status and income but is not completely reliable due to the severe lack of variance.
The South Korea model has incredible variance in the perceptions variable which is the reason for
the stronger relationships that supports the hypotheses. The model is significant, but a weaker
Nagelkerke’s r-square in both models is interesting considering the stronger individual
relationships. Nonetheless, the political party affiliation relationship accounts for the most in both
models – even more than the established trust in the government. The relationship is much stronger
than the other countries which is mainly attributed to the lack of trust in the political parties and
partisanship in South Korea (Park 1995) and to the stronger variance in the data comparatively.
The social status variable has the strongest relationship and significance, but the income one has
neither. Although it is also not statistically significant, the education variable goes the way that
was predicted in South Korea. This may be because of the more authoritarian past of the South
Korean government. President Park Chung Hee is noted for the repression of dissent among
intellectuals which may still carry some skepticism in the educated community now. The
hypothesis on political party affiliation is fully supported by the South Korea model and even
continues the trend found in the literature (Davis, Camp, and Coleman 2004). On the other hand,
the income and social status cases are only partially supported, and the education is only rejected
because of a lack of statistical significance.
Regarding the political party affiliation variable in each case, political party systems and climates
are another important explanation of the results. When the surveys were completed in Japan and
Singapore, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and People’s Action Party (PAP) continued to
enjoy domination of politics in their respective countries. One study described this as the “fusion
of party and state” (Hellmann 2017). Conversely, when they were completed in South Korea, there
was a heavily polarized climate. The ruling Saenuri Party held a small majority over the opposition
Democratic Unified Party in the National Assembly. South Korean citizens were strongly divided
along partisan lines – which is represented in the data. This is a critical piece to explaining the
sharp difference. It is not just political party affiliation, but also the level at which the parties view
each other as mortal enemies or merely a party with different views.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the hypotheses were not completely supported or rejected in Singapore or Japan, but
partially supported in South Korea. The political party affiliation hypothesis was strongly upheld
in the South Korea model, but not in the Japan and Singapore models. Political scientists should be
aware of a partisan bias when using perceptions of corruption surveys to measure corruption in
polarized climates, but, in more hegemonic systems, the relationship requires more rigorous

Published by University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well, 2022

9

Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

institutional, cultural, and historical analysis. Regarding socioeconomic status, there is a lot of
inconsistencies in the models. The variables went, for the most part, in the predicted direction just
not always strong enough to be statistically significant. Besides, for Japan and Singapore, there
was not enough variance in the data to have a robust claim. If anything, the fact that the South
Korean model was much stronger with more variant data suggests an important factor of external
validity.
Future research of perceptions of corruption in East Asia should continue to search for ways in
which those perceptions are affected. Scholars should create panels (instead of just surveys once a
year as the CPI and other indices do) to see, in real time and in longitudinal trends, if certain events
(i.e., change in ruling party, economic downturn, etc.) change perceptions of corruption. Research
should also include how a respondent’s position on a right-to-left spectrum affects perceptions
(Davis, Camp, and Coleman 2004). Further research into how specific job sectors of respondents,
political engagement (once clarified), and political stability/instability affects perceptions of
corruption would also be beneficial. Lastly, if the results of this research are any indication,
strategies should be made for more variant survey data.
Quantitative data analysis on perceptions of corruption by themselves does not serve scholars
much (Hellmann 2017; Reed 1996). One must understand perceptions alongside the
historical perspective for it. The “elite cartel” corruption structure has negative effects in
both the business and political sectors (Hellmann, 2017; Kang 2002). Corruption suppresses
competition in the business sector – leading to financial inefficiency (Woodall 1996) and
economic stagnation (Mauro 1995). Corrupt practices in politics become a tool to political
party domination (and stagnation) like in Singapore and Japan or a contributor to political
party instability and polarization like in South Korea. Researchers and policymakers think
too quickly about government institution reform without considering the options for business
reform. It maybe beneficial to explore reforms to the large business conglomerates 9 in South
Korea and Japan. If the government creates strong oversight institutions in the bureaucracies,
passes meaningful business reforms, educates the public to corruption, and houses politicians
with a sustained commitment to change, a successful lowering of real and perceived
corruption will follow. Non-corrupt practices will be more in the interest of business and
political leaders because of healthy competition, government oversight, and an unforgiving
public. Ultimately though, if policy decisions on anti-corruption are to be made, using
perceptions of corruption can be a helpful tool if they are understood in the context of the
country from where they originated.
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